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During the last decade a heightened awareness has developed on the potential of influenza infections 
in animals to cause serious disease in people. This is the result of increased reporting of zoonotic influ-
enza in humans as well as the intense circulation of influenza strains with pandemic potential within 
the animal reservoir. OFFLU (OIE/FAO Network of expertise on animal influenza) was created in 2004 
as a response to the large spread of the zoonotic avian influenza of H5N1 subtype. OFFLU is a formal 
partnership between the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) and the Animal Production and Health 
Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to maintain an active 
network of expertise on animal influenza. One of its four objectives is specifically to collaborate with the 
WHO (World Health Organization) influenza network on issues relating to the animal-human interface, 
including early preparation of human vaccines. Stronger technical collaboration, both institutionally 
and nationally, among scientists in the animal health and public health sectors has been established 
through joint technical discussion, information sharing and development and use of common tools.
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AbstrAct
Au cours des dix dernières années, on a de plus en plus pris conscience du potentiel qu’ont les infections 
animales par l’influenza à causer une maladie sérieuse chez l’homme. Ceci a été à la fois le résultat 
d’observations plus fréquentes d’infections par des influenza zoonotiques chez l’homme et de la cir-
culation intense de souches influenza avec un potentiel pandémique dans le réservoir animal. OFFLU 
(Réseau OIE/FAO d’expertise sur l’influenza animal) a été créé comme une réponse à la dissémination 
majeure du sous-type H5N1 du virus influenza aviaire à caractère zoonotique. OFFLU est un partenariat 
formel entre l’OIE (Organisation Mondiale de la Santé Animale) et la division de santé et production 
animales de la FAO (Organisation de l’Alimentation et de l’Agriculture des Nations Unies) afin de 
maintenir un réseau actif d’expertise sur l’influenza animal. L’un des quatre objectifs d’OFFLU est spé-
cifiquement de collaborer avec le réseau influenza de l’OMS (Organisation Mondiale de la Santé) sur 
les problèmes relatifs à l’interface animal-homme, y compris la préparation des vaccins humains. Une 
collaboration technique plus forte, à la fois institutionnelle et nationale, parmi les scientifiques des 
secteurs de la santé animale et de la santé publique a été établie au travers de discussions techniques 
conjointes, de partage de l’information et du développement et de l’utilisation d’outils communs.
Mots-Clés : influenza, zoonotique, tripartite, réseau.
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INTRODUCTION
Influenza viruses belong to the Orthomyxoviridae family cha-
racterized by segmented, single-stranded linear RNA-based 
genome. Such genome features provide high potential for 
reassortment between strains by exchange of segments and also 
evolution by gene mutation, which is provides influenza viruses 
with high level of adaptive change, for example for infection 
of new host species. Two of the eight gene segments code 
for the hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) proteins, 
instrumental in host-cell entry. At present, 16 H and 9 N 
subtypes are known -with potentially represents 144 possible 
subtypes- with different host susceptibility. Animals are only 
infected with type A influenzavirus. All known influenza A 
subtypes are found in wild birds, especially water birds, their 
natural reservoir, among which a subset have been reported 
in poultry and only a few in mammals.
Among naturally occurring diseases, pandemic influenza is 
widely considered to pose the greatest threat to global health 
security. Previous pandemic influenza viruses are believed to 
have either emerged from animal populations or had compo-
nents originating from animal populations. Human seasonal 
influenza viruses harbour molecular determinants of adap-
tation to humans and mostly infect humans, while zoonotic 
influenza directly originate from animal species (avian or 
mammal). The public health threat posed by influenza at 
the human-animal interface continues to be of concern for 
WHO (World Health Organization), OIE (Animal Health 
Organisation) and FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations), other animal and public health 
partners, and the world. New avian influenza virus strains, of 
which some have a zoonotic potential, frequently emerge and 
may spread for years in countries and regions. The trends in 
emergence and spread of zoonotic influenza have been growing 
in terms of frequency of events, impact and affected countries. 
This observed trend is the result of both better detection and a 
real increase in dynamics of avian influenza strains, mostly due 
to increased poultry production around the world, and espe-
cially in China, as well as intensified movements of poultry 
and poultry products.
The three recent highly visible global zoonotic influenza 
events have been: the on-going circulation of avian H5N1 
virus and derived strains, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and the 
emergence of avian influenza H7N9. Since 2003 an H5N1 
strain of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has 
spread around the world and has since then been responsible 
for almost 19,337 animal outbreaks (source EMPRES-i, FAO, 
as of 15th October 2015)2 and a total of 844 reported human 
cases, among which 449 human deaths (source WHO- as of 
15th October 2015)3. Then the pandemic H1N1 2009 strain 
showed human infections globally. It spread rapidly and in 
many countries became the predominant H1 strain infecting 
people. The study of the eight gene segments revealed that 
this strain derived from a reassortment of North American 
triple reassortant (from human-avian-swine viruses reassort-
ment) and Eurasian avian-like swine influenza viruses. Lastly, 
in 2013, a new zoonotic strain with pandemic potential, 
subtype H7N9, emerged in China in poultry and caused 
678 confirmed human cases and 271 deaths (since February 
2013). Moreover the 2014-2015 winter has witnessed the 
emergence of avian H5N8 HPAI in a few EU countries, 
and avian H5N2 HPAI in the US, both derived from the 
Eurasian H5N1. More than 250 poultry outbreaks with 
H5N2 were reported in the US from December 2014 to June 
2015, causing the death of 50 million poultry. No human 
cases have been reported in these two regions despite the 
zoonotic potential of these viruses. In March 2015, HPAI 
H5N1 hit West Africa again with more than 230 outbreaks 
reported between December 2014 and August 2015 after 8 
years with no outbreak (186 outbreaks had been reported 
between 2006 and 2008). The main response to these major 
influenza events has been for human and animal health 
authorities to work much more closely to monitor influenza 
infections in animals and to analyze these viruses for their 
potential threat to human health. Furthermore less visible 
events posing unknown risks to health continue to be iden-
tified, with increasing reports of sporadic human infections 
from a variety of influenza subtypes associated with animal 
infections, such as H1N1v, H1N2v, H3N2v (v standing for 
“variant”), and avian influenza H7N2. 
 Glossary/Glossaire
APHL: Association of Public Health Laboratories
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GISRS: Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System
GLEWS :  Global Early Warning System for Major Animal Diseases 
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(2)  FAO. EMPRES Global Animal Disease Information System (EMPRES-i). http://empres-i.fao.org
(3)  WHO. Cumulative number of confirmed human cases of avian influenza A(H5N1) reported to WHO http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/H5N1_
cumulative_table_archives/en/ 
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The ecology of these zoonotic influenza viruses is still partially 
unknown, in particular the determinants of transmissibility 
from wild birds to domestic birds, from animals to humans, 
and among humans, as well as reassortment events among virus 
strains. It is however obvious that the on-going circulation of 
such viruses in the animal reservoir, along with the on-going 
exposure of humans are responsible for human infections 
with zoonotic influenza viruses and pose a continued threat of 
emergence of a pandemic strain. Any strategy that reduces the 
risk of human exposure therefore reduces the probability that 
a pandemic virus might emerge. A continuous surveillance, 
with assessment of the pandemic risk, is required with animal 
influenza. This is a great challenge, given the high level of 
activity, wide spread of influenza viruses and the hardly pre-
dictable features of influenza ecology. The size of the poultry 
production sector and level of trade also represents a great 
challenge for proper surveillance. The veterinary sphere is res-
ponsible for the surveillance of the emergence and circulation 
of these influenza strains in animals. A good level of surveil-
lance is required in both domestic and wild animal species, 
and implies a good detection and sharing of results within the 
veterinary sector and with the human health sector. The issue 
of influenza surveillance, detection, prevention and control 
at the human-animal interface has to be conducted in a well 
coordinated manner, to have a global geographical coverage 
and to involve various stakeholders. 
One of the drivers of the ‘’One health’’ approach has been the 
H5N1 panzootic, with its attendant human and animal suffe-
ring and its impact on food security and economies. Influenza 
activities at the human-animal interface are part of a huge, 
complex and interrelated scope of work requiring coordination 
of global, regional and country aspects as well as of a spectrum 
of diverse players and a dedication to maintaining momentum 
over a long duration to ensure sustainability. The need for, and 
benefits of, having such collaboration at the human-animal 
interface is continually re-emphasized with the occurrence of 
new influenza events. The OIE/FAO joint network of expertise 
on animal influenza (OFFLU) network was founded in 2004 
by OIE and FAO, during the peak of HPAI H5N1 crisis, as a 
network of avian influenza expertise with the aim to ensure 
a good coordination within the veterinary world as well as 
a good interface with the human health world (Dauphin et 
al. 2010a; www.offlu.net). Since its foundation, this global 
network has matured and has made a few key achievements 
at the human-animal interface, including the establishment 
of mechanisms under the “OFFLU-WHO Collaboration’’ that 
will be described in this paper. A few other achievements at 
the national level will also be described.
 INSTITUTIONAL TRIPARTITE 
COORDINATION, ESPECIALLY THROUGH 
OFFLU, THE OIE/FAO NETWORK OF 
EXPERTISE ON ANIMAL INFLUENZA  
The OFFLU vision is that the animal health community will 
provide early recognition and characterisation of emerging 
influenza viral strains in animal populations, and effective 
management of known infections, thereby better managing 
the risk to human health and supporting global food security, 
animal health and welfare, and other community benefits 
derived from domestic animals and wildlife. OFFLU has four 
objectives: 
(1)  to share and offer technical advice, training and veteri-
nary expertise to international organisations and Member 
Countries to assist in the prevention, diagnosis, surveil-
lance and control of animal influenza; 
(2) to exchange scientific data and biological materials (inclu-
ding virus strains) within the network, to analyse such data, 
and to share such information with the wider scientific 
community; 
(3)  to collaborate with the WHO on issues relating to the 
animal-human interface, including pandemic preparedness 
for early preparation of human vaccine; 
(4)  to highlight influenza surveillance and research needs, pro-
mote their development and co-ordination. One objective 
out of four is therefore fully dedicated to the interface with 
the human health sphere. 
The core membership of OFFLU is composed of all 10 OIE/
FAO Reference Centres for animal influenza along with 
around 20 other diagnostic laboratories, research and acade-
mic institutes. A total of about 60 experts in the fields of viro-
logy, epidemiology, vaccinology, and molecular biology from 
29 countries and from international organizations are OFFLU 
contributors. Decisions and actions regarding OFFLU are 
taken by a Steering Committee and an Executive Committee. 
Strategic decisions are cleared by the two parent organizations. 
OFFLU is supported by a secretariat, technical working groups 
and OFFLU scientists (based on available funding) that may be 
based at the FAO or the OIE (figure 1). OFFLU gathers animal 
influenza expertise from all species susceptible to influenza Figure 1: OFFLU’s structure.
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infections: pigs, poultry, wildlife, horses, other mammals and 
humans. OFFLU established a specific group of experts in 
swine influenza after the H1N1 influenza pandemic. 
An effective and strong working relationship between OFFLU 
and WHO has been built over the last years. WHO has been 
present as an observer in OFFLU Steering Committee mee-
tings and human health experts have been members of some 
OFFLU groups and activities. WHO has also contributed to all 
OFFLU strategic and technical meetings. Vice-versa OFFLU 
has participated in most WHO strategic and technical mee-
tings related to influenza at the human-animal interface (e.g. 
vaccine composition meetings and strain selection process 
consultations, PCR working group meetings, research agenda). 
WHO participation in OFFLU meetings has ensured aligned 
strategies and technical decisions and improved exchange of 
information between the animal and human health sectors. 
However it should be noted that the WHO influenza network, 
called WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response 
System (GISRS, formerly known as the Global Influenza 
Surveillance Network (GISN)), was created many years before 
OFFLU, namely in 1952. This network has broader terms than 
OFFLU. It serves as a global alert mechanism for the emer-
gence of influenza viruses with pandemic potential, monitors 
the evolution of influenza viruses, provides recommendations 
in areas including laboratory diagnostics, vaccines, antiviral 
susceptibility and risk assessment. GISRS is also bigger in size 
than OFFLU, with around 150 public health laboratories from 
112 countries in the network. It is therefore by far stronger and 
more sustainable than OFFLU in terms of membership, means 
and volume of activities. However it does not have veterinary 
laboratories among its members but a few institutions working 
at the human-animal interface, which makes the linkage  with 
OFFLU a necessity for monitoring of influenza with zoonotic 
potential. The GISRS annual running budget is almost 30 
million US dollars while OFFLU’s annual budget, being subject 
to OIE and FAO funding support, may have been on average 
around 250,000 US dollars between 2005 and today, period 
where significant funding has been made available in the field 
of influenza.
Two other tripartite initiatives that support collaborative 
influenza work at the human-animal interface should also 
be mentioned. In 2006, in response to health threats such as 
H5N1 HPAI and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS), the OIE, FAO and WHO established a Global 
Early Warning System for Major Animal Diseases Including 
Zoonosis (GLEWS). GLEWS became one of the mechanisms 
used by the three organizations together for monitoring data 
from existing event-based surveillance systems and to track 
and verify relevant animal and zoonotic events. The other 
initiative is the tripartite Concept Note issued in April 2010 
and signed by the Directors General of the three International 
Organizations entitled ‘’The WHO, OIE, FAO Collaboration 
– Sharing responsibilities and coordinating global activi-
ties to address health risks at the animal human-ecosystems 
interface’’. Through this document, the three international 
health organizations have formally undertaken to work clo-
sely together, with joint strategies at the human-animal-en-
vironment interface, to support their Member Countries. 
Within the framework of this tripartite alliance, the three 
Organizations set themselves, the following year, three priority 
areas: zoonotic influenza, antimicrobial resistance and rabies. 
Under this framework, staff of the three Organizations regularly 
exchange information on influenza.
Human and animal health systems do not only need to work 
together to address zoonotic influenza but they can also learn 
from each other and use their complementary. Human health 
systems have a lot to teach to animal health systems, for 
example on the relationship between public authorities and 
vaccine manufacturers, on the global laboratory network and 
derived activities. The veterinary sphere also has services to 
offer at the human-animal interface: it is smaller in size, which 
makes it easier when it comes to coordination, it has strong 
abilities in describing disease epidemiology in animal popula-
tions, it is able to conduct surveillance of influenza strains with 
pandemic potential in the animal reservoir, it collaborates with 
environment specialists to better understanding of influenza 
ecology and it applies new technology vaccines after shorter 
time after their development. Sharing of epidemiological 
and virological information on a real-time basis remains a 
challenge for both sectors and a critical issue for prevention 
of pandemics and epidemics and should be addressed jointly.
 GLOBAL ACTIVITIES AND COLLABORATIONS 
AT THE HUMAN-ANIMAL INTERFACE 
OFFLU and WHO have established and implemented various 
sets of collaborative activities, some of which have been par-
ticularly fruitful. They have also established joint technical 
working groups, or groups with members from both animal 
health and public health sides.
Collaborative OFFLU/WHO activities 
Emergencies
When H1N1 was first reported in 2009, it was the first 
emergency for OFFLU to deal with (Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2009). The collaborative relationships among 
FAO, OIE and WHO were sufficiently well established to 
be mobilized within hours for the discussion and sharing 
of available information. The OFFLU network was already 
strong and flexible enough to expand within a matter of 
days to swine expertise and changed its scope and name to 
the OIE-FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza. 
OFFLU and WHO gathered international experts for a first 
WHO/OFFLU teleconference on H1N1 at the human animal 
interface only a few days after the first report. Three subsequent 
teleconferences on diagnosis, surveillance and diagnostic tes-
ting algorithms for the emergent virus in the animal health 
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sector were held the following two months. Reports from 
these discussions were made available on the OFFLU website, 
along with a variety of documents that were produced to assist 
animal health laboratories with identification of the emergent 
virus (i.e. list of laboratories for international shipment of 
H1N1-suspicious samples/isolates, guidance on the shipment 
of suspicious samples, algorithm for laboratory detection, 
guidance on sampling pigs for influenza diagnostic tests). The 
OFFLU network had also become established and respected 
enough to be asked by WHO to represent the animal health 
sector (in conjunction with OIE and FAO) in addressing two 
specific questions – the name of the virus, and specific issues 
regarding its origin – in high-level WHO teleconferences. A 
secondary benefit of these discussions was increased commu-
nication about swine influenza viruses in general among public 
and animal health experts and those new to the field. The 
Chairperson of OFFLU was interviewed by the journal Nature 
in 2009, which editorial stated: “OFFLU has also been outspoken 
on the need for countries to share virus samples and sequences for 
research and has built important bridges with the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and other public-health agencies. What is 
needed now is international support for a greatly expanded OFFLU-
like network that has enough funding to do its own research and to 
coordinate global surveillance efforts on influenza and other diseases 
emerging from animals.’’ The other influenza emergencies that 
required urgent communication among scientists from animal 
and public health were for the emergence of H7N9 in 2013 in 
China and the introduction of H5N8/H5N2 in 2014 in Europe 
and the US. Teleconferences have been held between OFFLU 
laboratories and WHO Collaborating Centers to discuss testing 
protocols and results and try to coordinate efforts in filling 
some gaps in tests validation and challenge studies. OFFLU 
was also invited to take part to some WHO teleconferences 
organized by the GISRS network.
OFFLU/WHO conferences 
Two joint conferences were held at the human-animal inter-
face and reports published, i.e. the WHO/OIE/FAO joint tech-
nical Consultation on Avian Influenza at the Human-Animal 
Interface; (Verona, Italy, October 2008) and the WHO/OIE/
FAO joint scientific consultation on influenza and other 
emerging zoonotic diseases at the human-animal interface, 
(April 2010, Verona, Italy) (Anderson et al. 2010; Dauphin 
et al. 2010b; World Health Organization/World Organisation 
for Animal Health/Food and Agriculture Organization, 2011). 
These meetings brought together top-level experts on influenza 
and other diseases from the animal and public health sectors to 
discuss virological and epidemiological priority issues, identify 
knowledge and technical gaps, and provide recommendations 
for further actions to address influenza and other emerging 
zoonotic diseases at the human-animal interface. Discussions 
emphasized that H5N1 was not the only animal influenza 
virus subtype posing an animal, zoonotic and pandemic threat, 
and that virological and epidemiological surveillance needed 
to be broadened to include other animal influenza viruses 
with zoonotic potential. A major gap identified by experts 
at the second meeting was an overall lack of capacity and 
mechanisms to adequately collect and link virological and 
epidemiological information from humans and animals at the 
national and global levels. These linked data are required for 
valid animal and public health risk assessments to be made. A 
third influenza meeting called One Flu Strategic Retreat held in 
February 2011 (Treviso, Italy) aimed at promoting the timely 
sharing of surveillance data and viruses from swine, avian and 
human populations with the ultimate goal of improving both 
human and animal health. Given the convergence of influenza 
viruses, people, animals and the environment, the need for a 
novel, integrated approach was acknowledged. Five activities 
were identified to progress on the One Flu concept, that were 
(1) developing a manuscript on Repositioning Influenza; (2) 
developing an influenza risk assessment tool; (3) strengthening 
data management and data banks; (4) ensuring continued 
influenza data sharing; (5) building partnerships for better 
integration of public and animal health new way forward.
 WHO consultation on the composition of influenza 
vaccines
This consultation process led by WHO GISRS aims to provide 
national public health authorities and vaccine manufactu-
rers with guidance on the selection of candidate viruses for 
use in the development of human vaccines. Since January 
2011, OFFLU’s contribution to the biannual WHO Influenza 
Vaccine Composition meeting (VCM) has been formalized 
through an exchange of letters among the three organizations, 
including detailed terms of reference (Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2011 ; 2012 ; 2013). This collaboration was 
formally extended for a new period of five years after the 
initial 3-year period. Under this collaboration, OFFLU pro-
vides before and during every VCM a summary of available 
epidemiological, virological and antigenic data on circulating 
HPAI H5N1 (and derived strains with zoonotic risk) and 
avian influenza H9N2 for each six-month reporting period. 
The data are collected from the FAO, the OIE and OFFLU 
institutions, and then compiled and analysed. The phyloge-
netic trees are built applying the same parameters as for the 
WHO Collaborating Centers, to enable data comparison. 
Furthermore since 2012 three OIE/FAO Reference Centres 
have been using ferret sera provided by WHO Collaborating 
Centers to test virus strains from the animal health sector for 
antigenic similarity to current human vaccine seed strains. In 
2014, OFFLU was awarded an Association of Public Health 
Laboratories (APHL) - US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) grant to improve the OFFLU contribu-
tion to the selection process for human vaccine candidate 
viruses for prepandemic preparedness purposes. The main 
outputs of this project include generation and distribution 
of ferret sera against animal viruses with pandemic potential, 
analysis of animal viruses with pandemic potential and data 
sharing within the OFFLU network and with WHO and its 
Collaborating Centers.
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In addition to sharing a technical report before the VCM, two 
OFFLU representatives attend the meeting (one from FAO 
and one from an OIE/FAO Reference Centre) and contri-
bute to the meeting’s discussions and outputs. This OFFLU 
contribution to the VCM therefore relies on veterinary labo-
ratories from several countries to share data (including unpu-
blished data) with OFFLU for confidential use at the WHO 
VCM. This contribution allows crucial information from the 
animal health sector to be used by WHO for determining 
and updating strains of inter-pandemic human vaccines. As 
a result, a poultry strain was already selected as a candidate 
vaccine strain, based on OFFLU’s reports and observed gaps 
in cross-protection. Although the means deployed in animal 
health are not comparable to those deployed in public health, 
OFFLU plans to develop a similar process for the selection of 
vaccine strains for poultry (to be conducted less frequently 
than the human one). 
Risk assessment
Given the unpredictability of influenza viruses and the fact 
that human infections may occur whenever viruses are cir-
culating in animals, vigilance and continual unisectoral and 
joint assessment of the health risks are crucial. One of the 
five activities that participants identified during the “One 
Flu Strategic Retreat’’ (February 2011, Treviso, Italy) was 
indeed the development of an Influenza Risk Assessment 
Tool that would provide the necessary signal to drive more 
specific pre-pandemic vaccine development. Later on, WHO 
and FAO and OIE through OFFLU, have technically and 
strategically supported and advised scientific institutions in 
the development of two influenza risk assessment tools for 
influenza strains with pandemic potential respectively deve-
loped by the U.S. Center for Disease Control (IRAT) and by 
a European consortium (FLURISK Tool). A collaboration 
goes on for the validation and application of these tools that 
requires common sets of data.  
Sharing of influenza sequence data
OFFLU advocates for influenza data sharing and the use of 
any of the existing publicly available sequence databases. In 
May 2011, the Sixty-fourth World Health Assembly adopted 
at WHO the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (or 
‘PIP Framework’) for the sharing of influenza viruses and access 
to vaccines and other benefits, after four years of negotiations 
(World Health Organization, 2011). This is an international 
arrangement that brings together Member States, industry, 
other key stakeholders and WHO to implement a global 
approach to strengthen preparedness for influenza pandemic 
and offer an equitable system to countries for access to pande-
mic vaccines. The PIP Framework is therefore an instrument 
established to ensure that countries share influenza viruses with 
human pandemic potential and also share the benefits derived 
from the sharing of those strains with all countries in need. A 
traceability system of ‘’PIP material’’ (i.e. influenza viruses with 
human pandemic potential) has been established. Even if this 
framework only covers influenza viruses with human pandemic 
potential, this may include influenza viruses of animal origin, 
if a given strain of animal origin is shown to have a link with 
human cases. Since the animal health sector was not part 
of these developments, OFFLU called for discussions with 
representatives of the PIP framework, after its resolution, to 
identify the possible implications of this legal framework on 
influenza activities in the veterinary sector. The sharing of 
benefits, if any, with the animal health sector derived from 
isolates originating from animals and becoming PIP material 
for human vaccine production is possible but terms would have 
be to be discussed within beneficiary countries. 
Such legal frameworks have to adapt to developments in 
technology. Companies and researchers can now develop 
influenza vaccines using only genetic sequence data. Like 
virus materials, sequences have therefore become essential 
for pandemic preparedness and response. They allow public 
health laboratories, research institutions and manufacturers to 
conduct risk assessments, carry out basic research in order to 
gain a better understanding of influenza and develop vaccines 
and other influenza-related products. However, in terms of 
sharing and traceability, sequence information is very different 
from physical viruses. Once sequences are placed in a public 
database, information sharing is facilitated, but traceability 
becomes challenging as well as protection of intellectual 
property rights. A Technical Expert Working Group was 
commissioned in 2013 by the PIP Advisory Group to assess 
the scientific, technical, operational and intellectual property 
implications of using genetic sequences rather than physical 
materials for influenza research and vaccine production, inclu-
ding how the transfer of such data could be monitored. FAO 
and OIE are members of this working group. The outcomes 
of this working group will have future consequences on the 
functioning modes of influenza sequence databases.
Research a gendas to guide research
In 2009, WHO developed an influenza research agenda in 
public health. OFFLU members actively participated to this 
effort. In 2010, an OFFLU Agenda for Influenza Research 
Priorities in Animal Species was developed by OFFLU scien-
tists, presented at the OFFLU annual technical meeting and 
endorsed by the OFFLU Steering Committee (January 2011). 
The development of these two separate research influenza 
agendas were coordinated and aligned. In 2014, a new OFFLU 
strategic agenda was developed for animal influenza research. 
The contributors to this effort were from the field of influenza 
including animal health and public health scientists, represen-
tatives from animal production and trade (poultry, egg, and 
pork), the pharmaceutical sector, equine sports, policy advisers, 
and representatives from research funding bodies. In 2015, the 
European Commission, along with the European Food Safety 
Authority, developed a European influenza research agenda, 
based on the OFFLU one. 
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Joint working groups 
Unified nomenclature for zoonotic influenza viruses
The WHO/OIE/FAO H5N1 Evolution Working Group, 
established in 2007, has selected three criteria for specific 
“clades” definition and grouped the circulating H5N1 viruses 
into numerous virus “clades” based on the phylogenetic cha-
racterization and sequence homology of the hemagglutinin 
gene of the influenza virus. This joint system for unified 
nomenclature has been updated three times since 2007 (World 
Health Organization/World Organisation for Animal Health/
Food and Agriculture Organization, 2014). As of today, such 
unified nomenclature has only been established for H5N1.
This nomenclature will have to be expanded to H5Nx and 
similar nomenclature would be useful also for other subtypes, 
in particular H9N2 (work under preparation at FAO, under 
the auspices of OFFLU). Moreover, FAO and OIE have been 
closely involved in the development by WHO of Best Practices 
for Naming New Human Infectious Diseases (in consulta-
tion with experts leading the International Classification of 
Diseases), issued in May 2015 (Fukuda et al. 2015). These best 
practices apply to new infections, syndromes, and diseases that 
have never been recognized or reported before in humans, that 
have potential public health impact, and for which there is no 
disease name in common usage.  ‘’(…) The use of names such 
as ‘swine flu’ and ‘Middle East Respiratory Syndrome’ has had 
unintended negative impacts by stigmatizing certain communities or 
economic sectors. This can have serious consequences for peoples’ 
lives and livelihoods.” (communication of Dr Keiji Fukuda, 
Assistant Director-General for Health Security, WHO). 
The OFFLU swine influenza group
Historically surveillance for influenza viruses in pigs has been 
neglected. Swine Influenza Virus (SIV) infections are widely 
disseminated on most continents and are not associated with an 
estimated high economic cost; consequently influenza in swine 
has not been an OIE listed disease. The OFFLU SIV technical 
group was created in April 2011 to support improved coordina-
tion of global swine influenza surveillance and harmonization of 
SIV diagnostics and provide meaningful analyses of data from 
different regions. The group includes leading SIV experts and 
public health experts, including WHO. It published a review 
paper on SIV worldwide, with co-authors from both animal 
and public health sectors (Vincent et al. 2014). So far all SIV 
group meetings have been funded by human health projects.
Staff exchange
Staff exchange among sectors has happened, for example the 
WHO influenza Collaborating Center at the human-animal 
interface (Saint Jude’s children hospital, Memphis, USA) 
had a post-doc scientist loaned at FAO for a few weeks. 
CDC seconded staff at the OIE and at FAO to work at the 
human-animal interface. These exchanges are however still 
made on an exceptional basis. 
 NATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND 
COLLABORATIONS AT THE HUMAN-ANIMAL 
INTERFACE 
Although OFFLU only conducted so far a limited number 
of actions at national level (e.g. OFFLU projects on vaccine 
efficacy in Egypt and Indonesia), a tripartite collaboration 
also exists on influenza at the human-animal interface at the 
national level. This paragraph provides two illustrations of 
such collaboration.
Four-way linking platforms
A tripartite work was initiated in 2010 through the develop-
ment of WHO/OIE/FAO “four-way linking” framework (called 
4WL). National-level linkages between the animal health and 
public health sectors, including linkages between the natio-
nal epidemiology and virology units, were then strengthened 
through the establishment of this 4WL framework in Egypt, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia and Viet Nam (Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2011; Forcella et al. 2015;  Setiawaty et al. 2015). 
National task forces have been identified in all these four coun-
tries and 4WL meetings have been held. In Egypt, the desi-
gnated task force met several times a year since its establish-
ment, shared information, assessed the HPAI H5N1 situation, 
the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome- Coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) risks, and planed national actions. These meetings have 
proved instrumental in facilitating the sharing of information 
between sectors and alerting public institutions of cases in 
humans and animals. The outcomes of a 4WL meeting held 
in January 2015 literally triggered an inter-agency emergency 
mission in Egypt, considering the change in epidemiological 
situation both in the human health and animal health sectors. 
These meetings, however, are still ad hoc, and the platform is 
not yet recognized as an official technical body. Technical 
recommendations made by the 4WL platform require high 
political support from decision makers, as most of the challen-
ges are beyond the capacities of technical institutions of the 
ministries of health and agriculture. A legal framework is being 
discussed in Indonesia as a basis of collaboration between the 
ministries of health and agriculture. A paper was published 
in Indonesia on the successful 4WL approach for joint public 
health and animal health outbreak investigation (Setiawaty et 
al. 2015). The 4WL aims at improving institutional collabo-
ration for smoother technical collaboration across sectors. In 
addition current efforts to develop a strong methodology for 
joint risk assessment are being made in Asia, initiated by FAO 
and WHO in Myanmar and should be expanded in the future.
 Joint assessment missions of national situations
From November 2014, Egypt experienced a major upsurge in 
H5N1-related outbreaks in poultry and in human cases and 
reported the highest number of  human cases ever reported 
by a country over a similar period of time. At the same time, 
poultry outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 were being detected in most 
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Egypt’s governorates; the majority occurred in household 
poultry. In light of this surge of H5N1 cases, the Minister for 
Health and Population requested an urgent risk assessment to 
better understand the current situation of H5N1 infections in 
both animals and humans. A team of international experts was 
formed, with members from WHO, FAO, OIE, the US Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the United States 
Naval Medical Research Unit 3 (NAMRU-3) and the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), to ascertain the reasons 
behind the rapid increase of cases, and to provide concrete 
recommendations to curtail the rate of infection. The mission 
members were divided into two teams, focusing on either the 
veterinary or public health side and met a broad range of key 
stakeholders. The findings and recommendations were debated 
among the two teams. Some team members from WHO even 
joined the animal health team to better understand the animal 
health situation. They realized the complex and multi-dimen-
sional situation (including poverty, livelihoods, marketing 
traditions and political context) in the animal health sector 
and admitted the difficult task for veterinary services and 
related stakeholders. 
CONCLUSION
The concept of “One Flu” has been identified as a good 
example for the “One Health” approach. Significant impro-
vements have indeed been made in terms of institutional col-
laborations, communication, joint work and analysis, common 
knowledge on zoonotic influenza viruses. However further 
collaboration between the public health and animal health 
sectors at global, regional and national levels, is critical for fully 
understanding and mitigating health threats. Mechanisms and 
systems built through work on influenza at the human-animal 
interface can be used by countries, regions and the interna-
tional agencies to confront the emergence of new zoonotic or 
potentially zoonotic events. Such mechanisms have actually 
been used to facilitate cross-sectoral communication about 
the novel Coronavirus which has caused disease and deaths 
in humans in some countries in the Middle East from late 
2012 and has an animal reservoir. But a wide variety of other 
existing and emerging threats such as rabies, antimicrobial 
resistance and food-borne zoonoses could also benefit from 
these mechanisms.  
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